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TAGS: FR, PFOR, PINT, PGOV

SUBJECT: SOCIALIST VIEWS ON DEFENSE MATTERS

SUMMARY: THIS CABLE IS AN EARLY LOOK -- PENDING RELEASE OF A PS STUDY DOCUMENT IN SEPTEMBER -- AT SOME OF THE FACTIONS, OPTIONS AND PROBLEMS FACED BY FRENCH SOCIALISTS AS THEY CONFRONT DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. WE CONCLUDE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FIVE MAJOR SCHOOLS OF DEFENSE THINKING IN THE PS AND THAT THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO AS THESE VARIOUS FACTIONS CONTEND WILL LEAD, SOME TIME PRIOR TO THE 1978 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, TO A FOREIGN/SECURITY POLICY WHICH WILL BE LARGELY TAILORED TO THE PRESENT THINKING OF FRANCOIS MITTERRAND AND THE MAJORITY OF HIS MAJORITY. AS TIME GOES BY, WE WILL WANT TO REVISE THESE FIRST, TENTATIVE JUDGMENTS, BUT THEY ARE SUBMITTED HERE AS A BEGINNING APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PS THINKING. END SUMMARY.

1. A LONG HISTORY OF NO SECURITY POLICY AT ALL: SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY SPECIALISTS OFTEN SAY THAT THE PS IS EXPIATING THE TRAUMA CAUSED WHEN THE OLD SFIO (FATHER OF THE MODERN PS) UNDER GUY MOLLET PARTICIPATED IN THE SUEZ DEBACLE AND PRE-DE GAULLE GOF ALGERIAN POLICY. THEY ALSO REFER TO THE FACT THAT MANY PS RANK-AND-FILE BECAME CONVINCED IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1955 AND 1971 THAT LEFT FOREIGN POLICY COULD AND SHOULD RELY ON PRIVILEGED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE EAST AND A CONTINUED AMERICAN NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. "HAVING NO FOREIGN POLICY OTHER THAN FRIENDSHIP WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND HAVING NO SECURITY POLICY AT ALL," SAYS ONE PS DEFENSE EXPERT, "WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THE ULTIMATE LINKAGE OF THE IDEOLOGICALLY CORRECT AND THE PRACTICAL." A PARTY WHICH DID NOT TROUBLE ITSELF WITH THE HARD QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES COULD -- AS THE PS OFTEN DID DURING THE GAULLIST HEGEMONY -- CONGRATULATE ITSELF ON NOT PLAYING TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT POLITICS AND ON PRESERVING THE PURITY OF ITS OPPOSITION TO "BOURGEOIS" (AND THEREFORE IMMORAL) POLITICS. IT WAS ALSO A WAY OF NOT FACING THE HARD CHOICES INHERENT IN SETTING UP FOREIGN POLICY.

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2. FACTORING IN THE PCF INFLUENCE: MITTERRAND AND SENIOR SOCIALIST LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE PCF WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON PS FOREIGN POLICY WHILE THE LEFT IS IN OPPOSITION AND WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME ONE IN A POSSIBLE FUTURE UNITED LEFT GOF. THEIR REASONING STRESSES THE DISPARITY IN VOTING AND POLLED STRENGTH CURRENTLY EXISTING BETWEEN PS AND PCF -- THE PS TODAY HAS AT LEAST 30 PERCENT OF FRENCH VOTER PREFEREN-

CES WHILE THE PCF APPEARS TO HOLD ABOUT 19 PERCENT. THAT MEANS, THE PS SAYS, THAT IT COULD IMPOSE ON A PCF PARTNER IN SOME FUTURE GOF A HIGHLY DISCREET ROLE, FAR AWAY FROM THE IMPORTANT MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WHEN ASKED WHY THE PCF MIGHT WISH TO CONTENT ITSELF WITH THESE, PS LEADERS INEVITABLY GO BACK TO EXPLAINING THAT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE PCF WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE SINCE IT WOULD BE BY FAR THE WEAKER PARTNER OF THE TWO IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF VOTERS REPRESENTED. WHETHER THIS EXPLANATION IS TRUE OR NOT, THE PS IS ACTING AS THOUGH IT IS. PS REPRESENTATIVES ON JOINT PCF/PS COMMITTEES CHARGED WITH WORKING OUT REVISIONS TO THE COMMON PROGRAM ARE STONEWALLING PCF INITIATIVES, ARE GIVEN NO LEEWAY TO NEGOTIATE AND ARE SUBJECT TO MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL CONTROL.

3. THE CURRENT SPECTRUM IS WIDE: THE PS, AS THE DIR-

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ECT HEIR OF THE TRAUMAS OF THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES, NOW SEEMS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT A FOREIGN POLICY IS NECESSARY. BUT AT LEAST ONE WING OF THE PARTY, HEADED BY NATIONAL SECRETARY FOR CULTURAL AFFAIRS DOMINIQUE TADDEI, ARGUES THAT ANY PS ATTEMPT TO DECIDE ON A SECURITY POLICY IS USELESS. AT THE OTHER EXTREME LIE THE VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SECRETARY ROBERT PONTIL- LON, WHO PRIVATELY FAVORS CLOSER NATO/FRENCH COOPERATION, AND OF DEFENSE EXPERT CHARLES HERNU, WHO IS OFTEN CALLED A CRYPTO-GAULLIST. IN THE GULF BETWEEN THESE THREE POSITIONS IS THE REASON WHY THE PS DOES NOT WISH TO RISK THE PARTY-WIDE DEBATE NECESSARY TO DEFINE A PARTY POSITION ON SECURITY MATTERS. FOUR OF THE FIVE MAJOR SCHOOLS WHICH SERIOUSLY CONSIDER DEFENSE AND SECURITY MATTERS ARE IN MITTERRAND'S MAJORITY -- A PARTY-WIDE DEBATE ON SECURITY ISSUES COULD BE A GREATER THREAT TO THE UNITY OF THE MAJORITY THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE QUESTION. IT COULD ALSO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A PS WHICH DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO OFFER, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT GOF (SHOULD MITTERRAND DECIDE TO IMPOSE HIS OWN VIEWS) AND THAT IS SOMETHING THE PARTY SEEKS TO AVOID.

4. THE ROMANTIC LEFT -- UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT -- DOMINIQUE TADDEI: USUALLY DISMISSED BY THE "MAJORITY OF THE MAJORITY" AS AN IMPRACTICAL BAND OF DREAMERS, TADDEI AND HIS CO-BELIEVERS NEVERTHELESS REPRESENT THE MOST PRIMITIVE EXPRESSION OF THE PS' TRAUMA. ARGUING THAT

FRANCE CANNOT ASSURE ITS OWN DEFENSE BY ANY CONCEIVABLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND/OR CONVENTIONAL FORCE, THE ROMANTICS BELIEVE THAT THE PS SHOULD OPT FOR UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. FAILING TO CONVINCE VERY MANY PS MEMBERS OF ITS VIEW -- TADDEI PROBABLY COMMANDS LESS THAN 3 PERCENT OF THE PARTY'S VOTES -- THIS GROUP FALLS BACK ON THE ARGUMENT THAT ANY LEFT GOF SHOULD PURSUE POLITICS DESIGNED TO GIVE FRANCE NOTHING MORE IN THE WAY OF DEFENSIVE FORCES THAN AN EFFICIENT BORDER GUARD. WHILE TADDEI AND HIS FACTION ARE POLITICALLY IMPOTENT, THEY REPRESENT, AS HERNU TERMS IT, "THE CONSCIENCE AND IDEALS OF THE PS". MORE IMPORTANT, SHOULD THE PS EVER HAVE A PARTY-WIDE SECRET

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DEBATE ON DEFENSE ISSUES, TADDEI AND HIS FOLLOWERS MIGHT WELL BE ABLE TO TRANSLATE CONSCIENCE AND IDEALS INTO TOUGH OBSTACLES FOR THE MORE REALISTIC PS EXPERTS.

5. THE FORCE DE FRAPPE IS BOTH TOO LITTLE AND TOO MUCH -- JEAN-PIERRE COT: A SLIGHTLY LARGER, CERTAINLY MORE VOCAL GROUP AROUND SAVOY DEPUTY COT ARGUES THAT ALL CONSIDERATIONS OF FRENCH DEFENSE NEEDS MUST BEGIN WITH A STUDY OF USG INTENTIONS. AS LONG AS THE AUTOMATICITY OF USG RESPONSE TO A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON FRANCE IS LESS THAN PERFECT, COT ARGUES, ANY FUTURE GOF MUST DISPOSE OF EITHER

- SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR FORCES TO ENSURE THAT THE USG WILL BE BROUGHT INTO A EUROPEAN CONFLICT;
OR

- NO NUCLEAR FORCES, THEREBY ENSURING THAT FRANCE IS NEVER A TARGET FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK.

COT RECOGNIZES THAT HIS VIEWPOINT IS BASED ON THE SHAKY ASSUMPTION THAT NO NUCLEAR ATTACK ON FRANCE IS LIKELY TO OCCUR UNLESS FRANCE HAS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, BUT HE BELIEVES THAT PROPOSITION IS TRUE AND OFFERS A HOST OF ARGUMENTS CULLED FROM ONCE-POPULAR AMERICAN SPECIALISTS IN DETERRENCE THEORY TO BACK IT UP. A SECOND FORMULATION WHICH COT USES MORE OFTEN IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC SUGGESTS THAT

- THE FORCE DE FRAPPE, AS IT IS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED, IS JUST IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO MAKE FRANCE A NUCLEAR TARGET FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE EVENT THAT THEY MAKE ANY HOSTILE MOVES ON WESTERN EUROPE;

- TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE GOF RAISE POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH FAR OUTWEIGH THE POTENTIAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES ACCRUING FROM THEM;

- TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED LAST-RESORT EMERGENCY ARMS. COT USUALLY SUMMAR-

IZES THIS VIEW BY SAYING THAT "PLUTON SHOULD BE
TARGETED TO FALL ONE METER PAST THE FRENCH CUS-
TOMS HUTS AT THE BORDERS."

6. SOCIALIST "NEO-GAULLISM" -- CHARLES HERNU: THE
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POPULAR AND WIDELY-RESPECTED PS DEFENSE SPOKESMAN ARGUES
THAT FRENCH DEFENSE, ALTHOUGH INSEPARABLE FROM THE
DEFENSE OF THE NORTH EUROPEAN PLAIN, MUST BE RECOGNIZED
AS HAVING A DISTINCTIVE VALUE AND MISSION WHICH CANNOT

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BE SUBSUMED THROUGH "EXISTING MULTILATERAL MEANS"
(THIS HAS EARNED HIM THE PARTY NICKNAME OF "THE NEO-
GAULLIST"). HERNU BELIEVES THAT FRENCH DEFENSE CANNOT
BE MELDED INTO NATO'S COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES
SINCE THESE DO NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS TO THE DEFEN-
SE OF FRENCH TERRITORY. HERNU'S MANY SPEECHES, BOOKS
AND PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS SEEM TO BOIL DOWN TO A NOTION
OF A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND NATO
WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FRENCH STRATEGIC AND TAC-
TICAL NUCLEAR FORCES AND WHICH WOULD LEAVE THEM INDEPEN-
DENT OF NATO CONTROL WHILE ASSURING A HIGH DEGREE OF
COORDINATION WITH NATO. IN EFFECT, HERNU IS ARGUING FOR
A LOOSER ALLIANCE THAN HE PERCEIVES NATO TO BE.

7. FRENCH INDEPENDENCE IS USEFUL TO NATO -- HERNU AND
ROBERT PONTILLON: HERNU JOINS HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUE PON-
TILLON IN ARGUING THAT A HIGH DEGREE OF FRENCH INDEPEN-
DENCE IN MILITARY MATTERS IS A DESIRABLE AND USEFUL WEA-
PON IN THE WESTERN ARSENAL. WITH FREQUENT REFERENCES TO
THE PERIPATETICS OF MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN RELATIONS,
BOTH MEN ARGUE THAT THE USG AND NATO MIGHT WELL FIND IT
USEFUL TO HAVE AN "INDEPENDENT FRIEND WITH A BIG STICK"
WHO COULD INTERVENE IN PLACES WHERE NATO AND/OR THE USG
MIGHT FIND IT "INCONVENIENT" TO DO SO (AS A RULE HERNU
AND PONTILLON REMIND AMERICAN LISTENERS THAT "BIG POWER
PARALYSIS" IS A PHENOMENON OF INCREASING RELEVANCE TO
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; THEIR MOST FREQUENTLY CITED
EXAMPLE IS ANGOLA). EVEN MORE INTERESTING IS HERNU'S
ASSERTION THAT A HIGH DEGREE OF FRENCH INDEPENDENCE

COMBINED WITH GOOD COMMUNICATION WITH BOTH THE ALLIANCE AND THE USG COULD INCREASE THE WEST'S CHANCES OF PLAYING "ROUGH AND SMOOTH" AGAINST THE SOVIETS. HERNU SUGGESTS THAT FRENCH REFUSAL TO JOIN IN SALT AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE, SOME DAY, A FACTOR IN SOVIET THINKING AND DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

8. "WE HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH GENERAL MERY" -- ROBERT PONTILLON: THE PS SHADOW FOREIGN MINISTER IS KNOWN FOR HIS NATO-LEANING PREDISPOSITIONS. PONTILLON SAYS PRIVA-
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TELY THAT THERE IS NO SECURITY FOR FRANCE WHICH DOES NOT PASS BY A PRIVILEGED ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES; ONE MEANS OF CREATING THAT ALLIANCE IS IN CLOSER TIES BETWEEN FRENCH AND ALLIANCE TACTICS. DOES THIS MEAN THAT PONTILLON BELIEVES THAT FRENCH RE-INTEGRATION IN THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE A USEFUL THING? YES, BUT HE ALSO CALLS SUCH A MOVE "POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR REASONS OF HERITAGE, VOTING, PS/PCF RELATIONS AND QUASI-RELIGIOUS BELIEF." FOR PONTILLON ALL FRENCH DEFENSE IS ORIENTED, WITH ONE NOTABLE EXCEPTION, TO A TRIP-WIRE CONCEPT. HE THUS FINDS PRETENTIOUS AT BEST AND DANGEROUS AT WORST THE TINGE OF GO-IT-ALONE THINKING WHICH HE CLAIMS IS AT THE HEART OF HERNU'S "NEO-GAULLISM." WHILE HE CLAIMS NOT TO BELIEVE IN AUTOMATICITY, PONTILLON CLEARLY HOPES THAT CLOSE FRANCO/NATO COOPERATION WOULD CREATE NEARLY AUTOMATIC GUARANTEES BASED ON THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR UMBRELLA.

9. THE DEFENSE OF FRENCH TERRITORY -- HERNU AND PONTILLON: WHERE PS INTERNATIONAL THINKING BREAKS DOWN, AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF BOTH OF THE MAJORITY'S SPOKESMEN, IS THE MOMENT AT WHICH FRENCH TERRITORY IS FIRST INVADED. ADMITTEDLY SPURRED BY MEMORIES OF WORLD WAR II AND CERTAINLY BY AN APPRECIATION OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE, HERNU AND PONTILLON BOTH ARGUE THAT THE END GOAL OF ANY GOF DEFENSE POLICY MUST BE A MEANS OF DEFENDING FRENCH TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ALLIANCES BLUR THIS DISTINCTION, THEY CLAIM. IN FACT, HERNU HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT NO FUTURE LEFT GOVERNMENT COULD ALLOW ITSELF TO BE BOUND INTO AN ALLIANCE STRUCTURE WHICH MIGHT LIMIT FRENCH FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF THE LOSS OF FRENCH TERRITORY TO AN INVADER.

10. THE CERES -- A SPECIAL PROBLEM: THE PARTY'S LEFT WING IS, IN MICROCOSM, A REPETITION OF THE PS DILEMMA WITH THE CENTER OF INTEREST MOVED CONSIDERABLY TO THE LEFT. ALTHOUGH CERES HEAD JEAN-PIERRE CHEVENEMENT (DEPUTY - BELFORT) IS RELATIVELY EXPERT IN MILITARY ECONOMICS, IS A RESERVE OFFICER WHOSE TIES TO THE

OFFICER CORPS OF THE ARMY ARE STILL GOOD AND HAS VIEWS
RESEMBLING HERNU'S, THE REST OF CERES' TOP LEADERSHIP
IS SPLIT BETWEEN THE ROMANTICS WHO BELIEVE IN UNILATERAL
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DISARMAMENT AND THOSE WHO, AS CHEVENEMENT PUTS IT, "ARE
AFRAID TO THINK ABOUT DEFENSE MATTERS AT ALL FOR FEAR OF
COMPROMISING THEIR MARXIST CREDENTIALS." CERES MEET-
INGS ON DEFENSE MATTERS USUALLY PRODUCE AN INCREDIBLE

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MELANGE OF LEFTIST ANTI-MILITARISM, CHRISTIAN PACIFICISM, LENINIST EXHORTATION AND MAOIST PRECEPTS, BUT WE KNOW SO FAR OF NO DEFINITIVE CERES STATEMENT ON DEFENSE MATTERS.

11. A FEW MATTERS ON WHICH THERE IS CONSENSUS: WHILE THERE IS NOT PERFECT PS ACCORD ON ALL OF THE ISSUES MENTIONED IN THIS PARAGRAPH, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT ON THESE ISSUES ALL BUT THE WILDEST ROMANTICS AND A FEW OF THE ARCH-CONSERVATIVES ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE PS, PARTICULARLY IN THE PERSON OF HERNU, BELIEVES IN A SIX-MONTH TERM OF MILITARY SERVICE. THE COMMON PROGRAM SAYS SO AND HERNU HAS REPEATED THE PARTY'S ALLEGIANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE. BUT EVEN HERNU ADMITS THAT HE CONTINUES TO RETHINK THE QUESTION AND, IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS, HE SHOWED INTEREST IN EXPLORING OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. THERE IS ALSO A PS CONSENSUS THAT STANDARDIZATION WITHIN NATO -- AND IN EUROPE -- IS A USEFUL THING, IF APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST AMERICAN MARKET DOMINATION CAN BE FOUND (SEE PARIS IR 6 832 0358 76 -- DTG 091100Z JUL 76 NOTAL). WITH ALMOST NO EXCEPTIONS THE PS IS AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF TRADE UNIONIZATION IN THE ARMY AND FOR THE IDEA OF NON-HIERARCHICAL PARTICIPATION IN EVERYTHING WHICH AFFECTS THE DAILY LIFE OF SOLDIERS NOT IN COMBAT SITUATIONS. AND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW OF THE ROMANTICS, EVEN CERES HAS ACCEPTED THE NOTION THAT MILITARY QUESTIONS CANNOT BE DEFINITELY RESOLVED. HERNU, PONTILLON AND CHEVENEMENT HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH GENERAL STAFF, WITH THE EMBASSY AND WITH FOREIGN MILITARY SPECIALISTS. THUS FAR, THEIR PRIVATE ATTITUDES HAVE BEEN QUESTIONING AND FAR LESS

IDEOLOGICALLY FIXED THAN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS MIGHT INDICATE.

12. PATRIOTISM IN FRANCE IS FOUND ON THE LEFT: A CONSTANT FACTOR IN LEFT THINKING ON SECURITY ISSUES IS THE CONVICTION, MORE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME SINCE THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD, THAT THE LEFT IS MORE PATRIOTIC THAN THE RIGHT HAS EVER

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BEEN. THIS CONVICTION IS BASED ON THE HISTORIC BELIEF THAT THE UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES COLLABORATED WITH THE GERMANS DURING THE OCCUPATION WHILE THE WORKING CLASSES FORMED THE BACKBONE OF THE RESISTANCE. FOR MANY SERIOUS PS DEFENSE ANALYSTS, COMMITMENT TO FRENCH NATIONAL SOLUTIONS AND THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF SAFEGUARDING EVERY INCH OF FRENCH TERRITORY AND PREROGATIVE AGAINST BOTH WOULD-BE AGGRESSORS AND AN ALLIANCE VIEWED AS ONLY TOO EAGER TO PLACE FRANCE IN A DEPENDENT, SUBSERVIENT ROLE, IS THUS A MATTER OF DIFFERENTIATION FROM THE CURRENT MAJORITY. IN THIS VIEW, THE GOF IS GIVING UP TOO MUCH FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY BY SEEKING CLOSER COORDINATION WITH NATO AND BY BEING OVERLY ATLANTICIST. OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS PS CONVICTION HAVE BEEN THE CONTINUAL SNIPING ATTACKS ON GISCARD FOR HIS ALLEGEDLY OVERLY-FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH HELMUT SCHMIDT (FOR SOME PS THINKERS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE FRG IS A RECOGNITION OF US HEGEMONY), FOR HIS BRAND OF EUROPEANISM (WHICH SOME PS ANALYSTS SEE AS LEADING ONLY TO A DIMINUTION OF FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY) AND FOR HIS FAILURE TO ASSERT FRENCH LEADERSHIP IN EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION PROJECTS (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ROME GROUP).

13. ATLANTICISM: "DESCRIBING OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ATLANTICISM IN ITS WIDEST CONTEXT," SAYS ONE PS DEPUTY, "IS LIKE TRYING TO DESCRIBE FINER SHADES OF GREY THAN THE EYE CAN SEE." THE PARTY IS WELL AWARE THAT THE WORD HAS BUT LITTLE REAL MEANING -- IT HAS BECOME A KIND OF CODE FOR "NATO AS IT IS ACTUALLY DOMINATED BY AMERICANS AND NORTHERNERS." IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MITTERRAND HAS USED THE WORD TO SPRINGBOARD DISCUSSIONS OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND FRANCE, AND ON THIS POINT HE HAS COMMITTED THE PARTY, AT LEAST NEGATIVELY, TO STAYING IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO SEEKING NO CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE IN THE EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY. SAYING THAT A LEFT GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE WOULD WAIT FOR THE OTHER ALLIES TO MAKE THEIR PROPOSITIONS FOR CHANGE, MITTERRAND SUGGESTED TO THE FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION OF PARIS THAT PS DISCUSSION OF NATO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT THE PARTY

SEEKS ANY ALTERATION IN THE CURRENT FRENCH/ALLIANCE

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RELATIONSHIP. BUT GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF PS THIN-
KING ABOUT DEFENSE ISSUES, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EVEN MIT-
TERRAND'S MAJORITY NOW CONSIDERS THE FIRST SECRETARY'S
THOUGHTS AS BINDING AND DEFINITIVE.

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14. THE PARTY -- SHORT-RUN PERSPECTIVES: THE PS IS FAR FROM HAVING DEFINED EVEN THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY/SECURITY DEBATE IS TO BE CARRIED OUT. NEVERTHELESS, SOME MAJOR LINES ARE ALREADY VISIBLE. THE DEBATE

-- PROBABLY WILL NOT COME BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH A DRAFT STATEMENT ON DEFENSE MATTERS IS SCHEDULED TO CIRCULATE IN SEPTEMBER, BUT MAY COME IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEM. THE PS CANNOT AFFORD A DIVIDED IMAGE PRIOR TO THE MUNICIPALS;

-- MAY BE AVOIDED ALTOGETHER IF MITTERRAND AND SENIOR PARTY LEADERS DECIDE THAT THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO CREATE POLICY BY SIMPLE DECLARATION;

-- WILL MOST LIKELY RESULT IN ADOPTION OF A LINE VERY SIMILAR TO THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN PONTILLON AND HERNU WITH MOVEMENT ALONG NATIONALIST OR "NEO-GAULLIST" LINES BEING A FUNCTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PCF IS PUSHING FOR NATIONALIST SOLUTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE DEBATE;

-- WILL IN ANY CASE PROBABLY BE IGNORED BY A PS-LED LEFT GOVERNMENT. MITTERRAND, PONTILLON, PIERRE MAUROY AND OTHER SENIOR PARTY LEADERS HAVE A LONG HERITAGE OF VISCERAL ANTI-SOVIETISM AND A GREAT SUSPICION OF SOVIET MOTIVES FOR KEEPING VAST NUMBERS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON THE BORDERS OF WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE PS LEADERS ALSO APPEAR TO BELIEVE -- BY INSTINCT, ANALYSIS AND EXPERIENCE -- THAT THE US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA IS A REA-

LITY BASED ON US ANALYSIS OF US INTERESTS,
THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A REALITY IN THE
EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY IN FRANCE AND IS,
THEREFORE, IF NOT SOMETHING WHICH CAN BE
TAKEN FOR GRANTED, AT LEAST A DEFENSE WHICH THE
US AND THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT
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SEVERELY DAMAGING ALLIANCE INTERESTS IN
EUROPE.

15. MITTERRAND -- HIS PERSONAL VIEWS: NO CONCLUSION
ABOUT THE PS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECURITY QUESTIONS CAN
BE COMPLETE WITHOUT AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND IS LIKELY TO THINK OR SAY FOR WITHOUT HIM
THE PS WOULD QUICKLY LOSE MUCH OF ITS COHESION. MIT-
TERRAND CAN, THEREFORE, TO SOME EXTENT IMPOSE HIS PERSO-
NAL VIEWS BY THREATENING TO RESIGN FROM HIS LEADERSHIP
POST IF HIS ANALYSIS IS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE PARTY AS A
WHOLE. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS MITTERRAND HAS BEEN A SHARP
AND FREQUENT CRITIC OF GISCARD. HIS MAIN CRITICISM HAVE
BEEN AIMED AT

- A PERCEIVED LOSS OF FRENCH NATIONAL AUTHORITY
WHICH MITTERRAND ARGUES IS A RESULT OF TOO
MUCH GISCARD WILLINGNESS TO BE INFLUENCED BY
US THINKING;
- AN EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR FORCES TO THE
EXCLUSION OF PROPER TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF
CONVENTIONAL FORCES;
- AN ALLEGED GISCARD WILLINGNESS TO CEDE FRENCH
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL INTO "ATLAN-
TIC" (READ AMERICAN-DOMINATED) HANDS, THUS
GIVING ALLIES A POTENTIAL VETO OVER FRENCH
FREEDOM OF ACTION.

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH SOME DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS
AND FRIENDS MITTERRAND HAS PAINTED THE PORTRAIT OF A
MAN WHO

- IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET CAPABILITY AND IN-
TENTIONS IN EUROPE;
- BELIEVES THAT FRANCE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT
SEEK INDEPENDENT ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. MITTERRAND WAS A HARSH CRITIC OF DE
GAULLE'S CLAIMS FOR A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
WITH THE SOVIETS AND CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT
THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE TRUSTED;
- IS CONVINCED THAT FRANCE MUST KEEP A STRONG
DEFENSE FORCE, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN
OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS APPEAR TO BE REDUCING
THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE ALLIANCE;

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-- UNDERSTANDS THAT FRENCH SECURITY DEPENDS ON A
HIGH DEGREE OF COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE;
-- WILL NEVERTHELESS SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON

AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE
AMCONSUL NICE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
DIA WASHDC

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ALLIANCE IS TAKING AS MANY STEPS AS IT CAN TO
REDUCE TENSIONS, SEEK DISARMAMENT AND LIMIT
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

16. THE EVOLUTION OF PS DEFENSE POLICY WILL DEPEND ON
MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING THE SEPTEMBER DOCUMENT, THE
EVENTUAL ENSUING DEBATE AND OTHER POLICY DECLARATIONS
AND INITIATIVES BY MITTERRAND. MOST OF THESE CONSIDER-
ATIONS ARE UNKNOWN QUANTITIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND
EVEN PAST BEHAVIOR IS ONLY PARTIAL GUIDANCE FOR HOW THE
PS AND MITTERRAND WILL REACT IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- ONE VIEW IS THAT THE PS WOULD NOT, TO THE EX-
TENT THAT IT REMAINS MASTER OF THE FATE OF A
UNITED LEFT GOVERNMENT, SEEK MUCH ACCOMMODATION
WITH THE EAST. WHILE THE SECURITY OF THE US
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA MAY ENCOURAGE THE PS TO A KIND
OF OPPORTUNISTIC FLIRTING WITH THE EAST (TO
DEMARK ITSELF FROM THE CURRENT MAJORITY AND TO
GIVE A KIND OF LEGITIMACY TO THE OPPOSITION
CLAIM TO BEING GENUINELY OF THE LEFT), MITTER-
RAND WOULD SOON IMPOSE HIS DISTRUST OF THE USSR
ON THE REST OF THE PARTY. MITTERRAND, WHO
PRIVATELY ADMITS THAT HIS VIEWS ON SECURITY
POLICY AMOUNT IN MANY WAYS TO A CONTINUATION OF
GISCARD'S, IS PROBABLY CLOSER TO THE PRESIDENT
IN REALITY THAN HE WOULD LIKE TO ADMIT PUBLICLY.

-- ANOTHER VIEW SEES A COMBINATION OF INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES FORCING THE PS TO A CER-
TAIN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE EAST. MITTERRAND,
ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, WILL WISH TO HAVE
RELAXED RELATIONS WITH THE USSR IF ONLY TO
AVOID FRICTION, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, WITH
THE PCF. MOREOVER, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED
THAT THE USSR MAY AT SOME POINT LAUNCH AN EF-
FORT TO COZY UP TO THE FRENCH LEFT, PARTICULAR-
LY IF ITS PROSPECTS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. THE

COMMUNIQUE MITTERRAND SIGNED WITH HUNGARY AND
HIS ENDORSEMENT OF MEDITERRANEAN DISARMAMENT
ARE SEEN AS EXAMPLES OF AN OPPORTUNISM, WHICH
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PROVED TOO TEMPTING IN THE PAST AND COULD
CONTINUE TO BE SO IN THE FUTURE.
WE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO SECOND GUESS AT THIS STAGE HOW
THESE INTERNAL ARGUMENTS AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES WILL
WORK THEMSELVES OUT. THE MOST THAT PS OBSERVERS CAN DO
AT THIS EARLY DATE IN ITS DEFENSE DEBATE IS OUTLINE THE
VARIOUS FORCES WITHIN THE PRTY, SET THE STAGE FOR THE
NEXT PHASE OF THE DEBATE AND SPECULATE ON HOW THE P-RTY
LINE WILL RESPOND TO EXTERNAL FACTORS. ANY MORE DEFINITE
ANALYSIS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO AWAIT THE EVENTS OF THE
NEXT SIX-MONTH PERIOD.
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